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ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the issue of Salt Lake City's inclusion on 
the special verdict form for apportionment of fault is moot. The 
jury determined that defendant was without fault and did not 
reach the issue of the City's fault or any apportionment. 
2. Whether under Utah's Comparative Negligence 
Statutes, non-parties are includable on the special verdict form, 
for the purpose of apportioning fault. The trial court's ruling 
is reviewed for correctness. Assay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1988). 
3. Whether plaintiff was prejudiced by the trial 
court's inclusion of Salt Lake City on the verdict form. The 
trial court's finding of no prejudice is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Kelly v. Utah Power and Light, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
4. Whether the trial court's refusal to allow 
plaintiff to call a witness which plaintiff had failed to 
designate on her court ordered witness list was an abuse of 
discretion. The trial court's rulings on admission or exclusion 
of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hardy v. 
Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE 3TAT0TES 
1. Utah Comparative Negligence Statutes, Sections 78-
27-37 through 41: 
78-27-37. Definitions. As used in Sections 
78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune 
from suit who is claimed to be liable because 
of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of 
legal duty, act, or omission proximately 
causing or contributing to injury or damages 
sustained by a person seeking recovery, 
including, but not limited to, negligence in 
all its degrees, contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, strict liability, breach 
of express or implied warranty of a product, 
products liability, and misuse, modification 
or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any 
person seeking damages or reimbursement on 
its own behalf, or on behalf of another for 
whom it is authorized to act as legal 
representative. 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. The fault 
of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. He may recover 
from any defendant or group of defendants 
whose fault exceeds his own. However, no 
defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the 
proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant. 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total 
damages and proportion of fault. The trial 
court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find 
separate special verdicts determining the 
total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery 
and to each defendant. 
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to 
proportion of fault—No contribution. 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be liable to 
any person seeking recovery is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages 
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equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant. No 
defendant is entitled to contribution from 
any other person. 
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. A person 
seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a 
party to the litigation, may join as parties 
any defendants who may have caused or 
contributed to the injury or damage for which 
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having 
determined their respective proportions of 
fault. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below. 
Plaintiff (appellant) Turner was involved in an 
automobile accident with defendant (appellee) Nelson on July 6, 
1989. The only witness listed on the police report, Daniel Rusk, 
observed that the stop sign controlling Nelson's direction of 
travel was obscured by foliage. Plaintiff did not make a claim 
against the city within the statutory one-year period (Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-12). Plaintiff filed this action against Nelson 
nearly two years after the accident. (Complaint, R. 2-4.) 
Nelson's Answer denied negligence and claimed that a 
third party was at fault (R. 9-11). In her Answers to 
Interrogatories filed in May 1991 and her deposition in July 
1991, she explained that the stop sign was blocked. At his 
deposition taken in January of 1992, Daniel Rusk also testified 
that the sign was obstructed. (R. 738-39.) 
3 
Plaintiff pressed for an early trial setting, 
representing to the Court that her discovery was complete. (R. 
23; 52-53; R. 62-63.) The Court held a scheduling conference and 
set a trial date of March 3, 1992. The Court ordered further 
provided that exhibits and witness lists were to be exchanged no 
later than February 14, 1992 with all discovery to be concluded 
February 20, 1992. (Scheduling Order, R. 68.) 
Defendant filed her designation of witnesses in 
accordance with the Court's Order. (R. 94-95.) Plaintiff filed 
her designation late, on February 19, 1992. (R. 97-98.) 
At the pretrial settlement conference on February 21, 
1992, defense counsel advised the Court and plaintiff's counsel 
of his belief that Salt Lake City Corporation should be on the 
jury verdict form for the purpose of apportioning its fault. 
Plaintiff objected. Subsequently, defendant made a formal motion 
to include the City which was granted. (R. 100-101; 358.) 
Trial commenced on March 3, 1992 as scheduled. On 
March 4, 1992, plaintiff moved the Court for leave to offer a 
previously unlisted witness, Jim Nakling. (Motion, R. 143-45.) 
Plaintiff represented that the witness would deny that the stop 
sign was obstructed. (Affidavit, R. 146-47.) Plaintiff gave no 
explanation for her failure to locate and identify this witness 
within the time set by the Court's Order. The court denied 
plaintiff's motion. 
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Trial was concluded on March 5, 1992. (Verdict, R. 
288-91.) The jury returned its verdict finding that plaintiff 
was not negligent. The jury did not reach the question of 
whether or not Salt Lake City or plaintiff was negligent in 
causing the accident. Plaintiff's motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict was denied (R. 297-98) and an order 
entered dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as no cause of action. 
(R. 294-95.) 
FACT8 OF THE CLAIM 
The accident occurred at the intersection of Third 
Avenue and Canyon Road in Salt Lake City. An approximate drawing 
of the intersection follows: 
3RD AVENUE 
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(Defendant's Exhibit 2.) 
This was the T-type intersection. However, unlike most 
T-type intersections, the through-way of traffic was the stem of 
the "T" (the direction that plaintiff was traveling), and not the 
top of the lfTff (the direction that defendant was traveling) . (R. 
415-16; 437; 653-54.) Defendant had never been on the road or 
through the intersection before. (R. 686.) 
The road on which defendant approached the intersection 
is curved, making it impossible for her to have appreciated the 
size and layout of the intersection until she was within 50 feet 
of it. (R. 417-18.) There was a dispute in the evidence as to 
whether or not there was a "stop ahead" sign in place to warn 
defendant of the intersection. (R. 394; 642; 649.) 
Defendant did not see the stop sign until immediately 
before she entered the intersection. She applied her brakes when 
she saw it but was unable to get completely stopped before the 
accident. (R. 331-32.) 
Plaintiff was traveling west on 3rd Avenue approaching 
the intersection. Plaintiff originally testified that she was 
going 30-35 miles an hour which was in excess of the speed limit. 
(R. 618.) At the time of trial, she testified that she was 
going 15-20 miles an hour. (R. 604.) She also applied her 
brakes and was almost able to stop before impact. (R. 604.) The 
two cars had slowed to approximately 5 miles per hour at the time 
of impact. (R. 408; 683.) 
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Defendant testified that the stop sign was obscured by 
trees and foliage as she approached it and was only capable of 
being seen just before she entered the intersection, (R. 335-
3 6.) Her testimony was corroborated by the testimony of the 
witness, Rusk. (R. 640.) 
Plaintiff testified that she did not see any 
obstruction to the stop sign. (R. 608.) She also presented a 
police officer who was at the scene, Mickey Paul, who indicated 
that he did not observe any obstruction of the stop sign (R. 434) 
and an expert, Newell Knight, who testified based upon his 
inspection of the accident scene that in his opinion the sign was 
not obstructed. (R. 398.) 
The jury apparently found defendant and Mr. Rusk to be 
more believable and concluded that defendant was not negligent. 
In view of that conclusion, the jury did not reach the issue as 
to plaintiff's negligence or the negligence of Salt Lake City. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Mootness—Plaintiff's appeal is based primarily 
upon the inclusion of Salt Lake City on the special verdict form. 
That issue is moot due to the fact that the jury found no 
negligence on the part of defendant. They did not reach the 
issue of apportioning fault. Even if Salt Lake City had not been 
on the jury form, defendant would have been fully entitled to 
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argue that she was not at fault due to the obstruction of the 
stop sign. The same evidence would have been received and the 
same arguments made. The presence of Salt Lake City on the form 
was inconsequential and, therefore, this issue is moot. 
2. The Statutory Scheme Provides for the Apportionment 
of Fault to Non-Parties—The Utah comparative negligence statutes 
specifically provide for the consideration of the fault of any 
person who is claimed to be liable in causing the accident,, 
Section 78-27-39 provides for the use of a special verdict form 
which determines "the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each 
*defendant'." As noted in plaintiff's brief, the word 
"defendant" is specifically defined by Section 78-27-37 to be any 
person who is claimed to have had fault in causing the injury, it 
is not limited to parties. 
The statutes, which were passed in 1986, eliminated the 
previous scheme of a joint and several liability of joint tort-
feasors as well as contribution actions. They specifically 
limited a defendant's liability to his particular proportion of 
fault only. (Section 78-27-38). 
The inclusion of non-party tort-feasors is essential to 
the statutory scheme. Without such persons on the verdict form, 
a defendant or plaintiff may be saddled with more than his 
proportionate share of fault resulting in an improper result. 
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Plaintiff's argument that Section 78-27-41 changes the 
entire approach of the statutes and requires that any person to 
whom fault may be apportioned must be a party to the litigation 
is a misreading of the statute and its overall intent. That 
section merely provides that a defendant may join a joint tort-
feasor as a party to the litigation but does not require it. 
Such a joinder may work to a defendant's benefit in order to 
facilitate discovery or for other strategic purposes in handling 
the lawsuit. But the section is not mandatory and does not 
change the basic statutory scheme. 
3. The Addition of salt Lake ^ity to the Jury Form Did 
Not Prejudice Plaintiff—Plaintiff waited more than one year 
after the accident before commencing any litigation. The statute 
of limitations for a claim against Salt Lake City had run. 
Whether Salt Lake City was joined as a defendant in this lawsuit 
or not, made no difference to plaintiff because plaintiff could 
not recover from Salt Lake City. 
The key issues of fact in the case were unchanged by 
adding Salt Lake City to the verdict form. Plaintiff claimed 
that the stop sign was visible to the defendant and she should 
have stopped. The defendant claimed that the stop sign was 
obstructed. 
As pointed out by Judge Frederick: 
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My decision to allow Salt Lake City on the 
verdict form for the purpose of apportionment 
of the responsibility here really does not 
change the essential defense that the sign 
was obstructed, 
(R. 744.) 
The facts and evidence were unchanged. Plaintiff was 
not caught unaware that defendant was claiming that the sign had 
been obstructed. Plaintiff had been aware of that claim from 
early on in the case. There was no new or surprise defense and, 
therefore, no prejudice to plaintiff. 
4. Plaintiff Failed to Comply with the Court's Order 
Regarding Identification of Witnesses and was Properly Precluded 
From Bringing on a Surprise Witness in the Second Day of Trial— 
The issue of foliage obstructing the stop sign had been known to 
plaintiff no later than May 29, 1991 when defendant responded to 
plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories. Plaintiff began trial 
with three witnesses on the obstruction issue: herself, the 
police officer and her expert. On the second day of trial, 
plaintiff's counsel advised the Court that he had found a fourth 
witness and wanted to offer his testimony. 
Plaintiff's attempt to bring on a new witness was in 
violation of the Court's Scheduling Order. Plaintiff's counsel 
gave no explanation of why this witness was not located and 
listed prior to trial. Plaintiff suggested that the addition of 
Salt Lake City to the verdict form had somehow changed the 
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factual issues in the case. Judge Frederick properly rejected 
this argument, pointing out that plaintiff had been aware of the 
issue of obstruction of the stop sign from early on in the case 
and had already presented several witnesses on the issue. 
Judge Frederick enforced the Scheduling Order and 
precluded the new witness. 
The trial court's determination will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of that discretion. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 
(Utah App. 1989). "The trial court does not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to admit evidence which is not timely provided to the 
opposing counsel contrary to the court's instructions." Id. at 
p. 925. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY 
ON THE VERDICT FORM IS MOOT. 
The jury determined that defendant was not negligent. 
The jury did not reach the issue of whether or not plaintiff 
herself was negligent or Salt Lake City was negligent. In view 
of the jury's determination, the issue of whether or not Salt 
Lake City should be included on the jury verdict form is of no 
consequence. 
Plaintiff's attempt to suggest that the inclusion of 
Salt Lake City on the verdict form in some way altered the facts, 
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evidence or argument of the case is incorrect. Defendant's 
position from the time of filing her answer in this case was that 
she was not negligent. In proving that position, she was 
entitled to put on evidence to demonstrate her freedom from fault 
and the fault of others. Even if Salt Lake City had not been on 
the verdict form, defendant would have made the same argument, 
claiming that she was free of fault because the stop sign could 
not be seen. 
The inclusion or failure to include a non-party joint 
tort-feasor on the verdict form is of no consequence when the 
party at issue is found to have no negligence. Beitzel v. City 
of Coeur d' Alene, 827 P.2d 1160 (Ida. 1992). The Beitzel case 
is analogous to the instant case. It involved a situation in 
which a non-party was erroneously not included on the special 
verdict form. The Idaho Supreme Court held that since the 
plaintiff was found to have no fault in the accident, the 
inclusion or non-inclusion of the non-party on the verdict form 
was irrelevant. 
In the Beitzel case, the fact that plaintiff had no 
negligence made the inclusion of non-parties on the special 
verdict form irrelevant. Similarly, in the instant case, the 
fact that defendant was found to be free of negligence makes the 
inclusion or lack of inclusion of Salt Lake City on the special 
verdict form irrelevant and moot. 
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POINT II 
THE INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY ON THE VERDICT FORM IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTES. 
The applicable Utah comparative negligence statutes 
were enacted in 1986 as the Tort Reform Act. The Act eliminated 
contribution between joint tort-feasors and established a system 
under which no defendant is liable for more than her respective 
share of fault. (§ 78-27-38 U.C.A.) In order to effectuate the 
purpose and scheme of the Act, it is necessary to include all of 
the persons or entities who share in the fault, not just those 
who happen to be parties to the case. 
The Act uses a special definition of the word 
"defendant" to include "any person not immune from suit who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery." (§ 78-27-37(1) U.C.A.) There is no requirement that 
a "defendant" be an actual party to the lawsuit. This expansive 
definition includes non-party joint tort-feasors. 
The Legislature specifically directs how special 
verdict forms should be structured in Section 78-27-39. It 
provides: 
The trial court may, and when requested by 
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to 
find separate special verdicts determining 
the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery 
and to each defendant. 
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(Emphasis added.) 
Based upon the Act's special definition of the word 
"defendant", this section means that the special verdict form 
will provide for an allocation of fault attributable to each 
person or entity who is claimed to be a joint tort-feasor, 
regardless of whether or not they are actually parties to the 
lawsuit. Any other interpretation of Section 39 as clarified by 
the definition found in Section 37 ignores the clear language of 
those sections and would violate Section 38 which limits each 
party's liability to his own percentage of fault. 
Plaintiff's claim that the Legislature reversed this 
rule by the provisions of Section 78-27-41 is incorrect. Section 
41 provides that any party to the lawsuit may join as parties any 
joint tort-feasors by filing a third party complaint that does 
not seek dollar relief, but simply asks for apportionment. The 
section does not require such joinder. There is nothing in 
Section 41 that states that in the absence of such joinder, those 
non-parties will be kept off of the special verdict form. The 
only section that deals with the special verdict form is Section 
39 which directs their inclusion. 
Plaintiff's argument that this literal interpretation 
makes Section 41 mere surplusage is fallacious. Section 41 gives 
all parties to the lawsuit the ability to join joint tort-feasors 
for the purpose of discovery and trial. Each party can make a 
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strategic decision as to whether there is benefit or not in 
joining such non-party joint tort-feasors. For example, it may 
be to a defendant's benefit to join the non-party in order to 
facilitate the taking of depositions, obtaining documents, and 
other discovery procedures it needs in order to prepare its case. 
Additionally, a defendant may conclude that it would be of 
assistance at trial to have them joined. These are strategic 
options which Section 41 gives to all parties to the lawsuit. 
However, the giving of that option with the permissive word "may" 
does not change the basic structure of Sections 37-39 which 
provides for inclusion of all joint tort-feasors on the special 
verdict form. 
Plaintiff's argument ignores the realities of many 
lawsuits. For example, a particular joint tort-feasor may not be 
subject to jurisdiction in Utah. Nevertheless, under the 
statutory scheme, a plaintiff may go ahead and sue those joint 
tort-feasors who are subject to Utah jurisdiction. The 
defendants in such a case would not be precluded from having 
fault allocated to the joint tort-feasor who is not subject to 
Utah jurisdiction and therefore not a party. 
The inclusion of non-parties on the verdict benefits 
not only defendants but plaintiffs as well. Bode v. Clark 
Equipment Co., 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986). In the Bode case, the 
Oklahoma court affirmed a plaintiff's right to include a non-
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party on the special verdict form. Plaintiff's concern was to 
assure that his own fault was calculated at less than 50 percent. 
The same concern will apply for plaintiffs in Utah cases.1 
Utah's statutory language is unique but similar to the 
statutes of a number of other states. Generally, only those 
states whose statutes specifically restrict the special verdict 
"to all parties" will preclude non-parties from the verdict form. 
Those state courts are constrained by the statutes passed by 
their legislatures. See, for example, Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 
603 (Ore. 1987); Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282 (Nev. 
1984) and National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. 
Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983). These are the cases 
relied upon by plaintiff in her brief. They are all easily 
distinguishable because of the restricted statutory language 
utilized. 
Cases from those states with statutes which, like 
Utah's, do not specifically limit the special verdict form to the 
1For example, suppose that Plaintiff's fault was 40 percent, 
Defendant A was 2 0 percent, Defendant B was 2 0 percent, and 
Defendant C who is not subject to the court's jurisdiction is 2 0 
percent. Under Section 78-27-38, if all joint tort-feasors are 
included on the special verdict form, Plaintiff will recover 20 
percent of her damages from Defendant A and 20 percent from 
Defendant B. However, if Defendant C were not included on the 
special verdict form because it was not a party to the lawsuit, the 
fault would be evenly split between Plaintiff on the one hand and 
Defendants A and B jointly on the other hand. As a result, under 
Section 38, Plaintiff would recover nothing. 
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parties, support the rule of law that all joint tort-feasors 
should be included on the special verdict form. The rationale 
was summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows: 
We now adopt the rule which was suggested by 
Tucker and Jensen which is clearly the 
prevalent practice among state courts. "It 
is established without doubt that when 
apportioning negligence, a jury must have the 
opportunity to consider the negligence of all 
parties to the transaction, whether or not 
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or 
not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to 
the other tort-feasors by operation of law or 
because of a prior release." [Citation.] 
"The reason for such a rule is that true 
apportionment cannot be achieved unless that 
apportionment includes all tort-feasors 
guilty of causal negligence either causing or 
contributing to the occurrence in question, 
whether or not they are parties to the case." 
[Citations.] 
Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West. Inc.. 621 P.2d 399 
(Ida. 1980) at 403. (Emphasis added.) 
See also, DaFonte v. Up-Right. Inc.. 828 P.2d 140. 
"Damages must be apportioned among *universe' of tort-feasors 
including xnon-joined defendants'." 828 P.2d at 146; Dietz v. 
General Electric Company. 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991); and Paul v. 
N.L. Industries. Inc.. 624 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1980). ". . . the 
negligence of tort-feasors not parties to the lawsuit should be 
considered by the trial jury in order to properly apportion the 
negligence of those tort-feasors who are parties." Cited with 
approva1: Bode v. Clark Eguipment, Supra. 
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The public policy supporting the consideration of fault 
of non-parties is not new. The concept and theory of comparative 
fault requires full comparison with all tort-feasors, whether or 
not they are parties. This is particularly true when, as in 
Utah, the defendants have no right of contribution. Professor E. 
Wayne Thode of the University of Utah Law School argued for such 
consideration even under Utah's previous comparative negligence 
statutes. 1973 Law Review, "Comparative Negligence, Contribution 
Among Joint Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of a Release—A Triple 
Play by the Utah Legislature", p. 406. Without the inclusion of 
all tort-feasors on the verdict form, the comparative fault 
analysis becomes distorted and illogical. 
POINT III 
THE ADDITION OF SALT LAKE CITY ON THE VERDICT 
FORM DID NOT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff was aware from the time she received 
defendant's Answers to Interrogatories in May of 1991 that 
defendant was claiming that the stop sign in question was 
obstructed by trees and foliage. (R. 14.) Plaintiff's attorney 
was present at the depositions of defendant and witness Rusk 
which further elaborated on the nature of the obstruction. 
Plaintiff was clearly aware that part of defendant's defense was 
to claim that the stop sign was not properly visible. Adding 
Salt Lake City to the verdict form did not change the factual 
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issue regarding obstruction of the stop sign whatsoever. It was 
an issue that plaintiff had been long familiar with. 
In her brief on appeal, plaintiff has alleged that the 
inclusion of Salt Lake City caused prejudice to her. 
Judge Frederick properly found that no prejudice was 
involved. The inclusion of Salt Lake City did not change the 
defense presented by defendant nor did it change or alter the 
evidence. The factual issue still remained as to whether the 
stop sign was obstructed by foliage. 
Plaintiff's brief has cited a number of cases regarding 
amendment to pleadings. In this case, there was no amendment of 
pleadings. There was no change of claim or defense. 
Even if this matter were to be considered under the 
standards regarding late amendments to pleadings, it is clear 
that the trial judge was well within his discretion. As cited by 
plaintiff, in the case of Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 
1189 (Utah App. 1987), the Court of Appeals commented: 
In considering a motion to amend, a trial 
judge must decide ^whether the opposing side 
would be put to unavoidable prejudice by 
having an issue adjudicated for which he had 
not had time to prepare.7 [Citation.] 
Absent a clear abuse of discretion, this 
court will not disturb a trial court's ruling 
on a motion to amend. 
746 P.2d at 1190. (Emphasis added). 
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In this case, Judge Frederick found that plaintiff was 
not having to adjudicate an issue for which she had not had time 
to prepare. She had known about the obstruction issue for almost 
a year. The facts not only support but compel Judge Frederick's 
conclusion that plaintiff had shown no prejudice. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING 
IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES AND WAS PROPERLY PRECLUDED FROM 
BRINGING ON A SURPRISE WITNESS IN THE SECOND DAY OF TRIAL. 
Plaintiff pushed this case to early trial. (R. 23; 52-
53; 62-63.) She represented that her discovery and investigation 
were complete and ready for trial. 
At the time the Court set trial at plaintiff's 
insistence, the Court ordered that witness lists be exchanged by 
February 14, 1992, 18 days prior to trial. Plaintiff did not 
comply with the Order but did file a designation of witnesses 
five days late on February 19, 1992. 
On the second day of trial, while plaintiff's case in 
chief was still going forward, plaintiff advised the Court that 
she had discovered a new witness, Mr. Nackling, and wished to 
offer his testimony with regard to whether or not the stop sign 
was obstructed. Mr. Nackling had not been included on 
plaintiff's witness list. Plaintiff subsequently renewed her 
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motion at the close of defendant's case, attempting to 
characterize Mr. Nackling as a rebuttal witness. 
Defendant objected. Judge Frederick refused to permit 
the witness to testify, stating: 
. . . It has been the essential defense here 
that the sign was obstructed, thereby 
limiting the defendant's opportunity to 
timely observe it and take appropriate 
action. That aspect of the Geurts testimony 
is not new, and my decision to allow Salt 
Lake City on the verdict form for the 
purposes of apportioning the responsibility 
here really does not change the essential 
defense that the sign was obstructed. The 
claim here has been made that that was a fact 
and evidence has been adduced, if it is 
believable to the jury, that that was the 
fact, and now at this point, this late date, 
it seems to me it puts the [defendant] at an 
unfair disadvantage, not knowing who this 
individual is, and having had the opportunity 
to cross examine or at least depose this 
witness, while as Mr. Geurts was available 
and notified in a timely fashion as far as 
the opposition was concerned, that he would 
be testifying. I am persuaded that it would 
place the [defendant]5 in an unfair posture 
to grant this motion and its denied. 
(R. 744.) 
Judge Frederick's ruling is consistent with orderly 
litigation management and the particular facts of this case. It 
was plaintiff's burden in presenting her case in chief to 
demonstrate that defendant either failed to keep a proper lookout 
2Judge Frederick inadvertently said "plaintiff" rather than 
"defendant." In subsequent discussion he clarified that he meant 
to refer to defendant. (R. 744-745.) 
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or failed to observe a stop sign. Plaintiff was fully aware that 
defendant was claiming that the stop sign was obstructed. It was 
part of plaintiff's case in chief to demonstrate that the stop 
sign was there and observable. She put on evidence to prove that 
it was observable through her expert, Newell Knight, R. 398-403; 
through the testimony of Officer Mickey F. Paul, R. 434) and 
through her own testimony, (R. 608). For plaintiff to now claim 
that the obstruction of the stop sign was "something new" raised 
for the first time in defendant's portion of the case is 
fallacious and Judge Frederick's ruling pointed out that fact. 
In her brief, defendant takes great pains to attempt to 
describe Mr. Nackling's testimony as "rebuttal" testimony. As 
such, she argues she should be exempt from the requirements of 
the court order to designate witnesses and should have been able 
to present Mr. Nackling. Even her own cases do not support this 
proposition. She cites the case of Morgan v. Commercial Union 
Assurance Companies, 606 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1979) in which the 
Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to allow a witness 
who was not listed in the court ordered designation of witnesses 
to testify. The court pointed out: 
However that may be, a defense witness whose 
purpose is to contradict an expected and 
anticipated portion of plaintiff's case can 
never be considered a "rebuttal witness" or 
anything analogous to one. 
606 F.2d at 556. 
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In this case, Mr. Nackling's testimony was intended to 
bolster plaintiff's case in chief on the obstruction issue and to 
attack an "anticipated portion" of the defendant's case. 
State v. Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515 (Utah 1989) cited by 
plaintiff stands for the same principle. In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld a trial court's decision to allow a non-
listed rebuttal witness to testify. But the holding was based 
upon the fact that the defendant in the case had changed her 
testimony at trial raising new facts. The court found that there 
was "new" evidence that justified the new rebuttal testimony. No 
such new evidence was involved in this case. 
In this case, the trial court refused to allow 
plaintiff to bring on an undisclosed witness who would testify 
regarding issues that were not new and that had been specifically 
addressed in plaintiff's case in chief. In such cases, appellate 
courts uniformly uphold the decision of the trial court. See, 
for example, Wirth v. Commercial Resources, Inc., 630 P.2d 292 
(N.M. App. 1981). 
Although defense counsel tried to 
characterize Mr. Patterson's testimony as 
"rebuttal" it was not such. As suggested in 
the pretrial order, rebuttal witnesses are 
those persons "the necessity of whose 
testimony reasonably cannot be anticipated 
before the time of trial." . . . Being part 
of the planned defense, it was not rebuttal 
evidence. The court did not err in refusing 
to allow it. 
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630 P.2d at 298; and Kremer v. Audett, 668 P.2d 1315 (Wa. App. 
1983). (Emphasis added.) 
Rebuttal evidence is admitted to enable the 
plaintiff to answer a new matter presented by 
the defense. [Citation]. Genuine rebuttal 
evidence is not simply a reiteration of 
evidence in chief but consists of evidence 
offered in reply to new matters. The 
plaintiff, therefore, is not allowed to 
withhold substantial evidence supporting any 
of the issues which it has the burden of 
proving in its case in chief merely in order 
to present this evidence cumulatively at the 
end of defendant's case. 
668 P.2d at 1317. (Emphasis added.) 
The Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted in Utah and 
most states of the United States are intended to provide each 
party with full access to the other's case to avoid surprises at 
trial. To allow one side to use a witness that was not 
revealed in violation of a court order jeopardizes the other 
party's trial preparation and should not be permitted. Kott v. 
City of Phoenix, 763 P.2d 235 (Ariz. 1988). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has not hesitated to uphold a 
trial judge's ruling in excluding a witness who was not listed. 
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989). The court stated: 
The trial court does not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to admit evidence which is not 
timely provided to the opposing party 
contrary to the court's instructions. 
Id. at p. 917. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's primary basis for this appeal has become 
moot. The jury found no fault on the part of the defendant. The 
issue of apportionment was not reached on the special verdict 
form andf therefore, was of no consequence* Even in the absence 
of mootness, the inclusion of Salt Lake City on the verdict form 
was mandated by the comparative negligence statutes and caused no 
prejudice to plaintiff. 
The trial court's exclusion of witness Nackling is 
solidly supported by case law. Plaintiff failed to list Mr. 
Nackling on her court ordered designation of witnesses. Mr. 
Nackling's testimony was addressed to one of the issues of 
plaintiff's case in chief. Judge Frederick's decision to exclude 
Nackling was correct. 
DATED this day of ^  7 / , ^ ^ , 1993 
RIC , MILLER & NELSON 
ROBERT W STEVES 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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